We study the semilinear partial differential equation (PDE) associated with the non-linear BSDE characterizing buyer's and seller's XVA in a framework that allows for asymmetries in funding, repo and collateral rates, as well as for early contract termination due to counterparty credit risk. We show the existence of a unique classical solution to the PDE by first proving the existence and uniqueness of a viscosity solution and then its regularity. We use the uniqueness result to conduct a thorough numerical study illustrating how funding costs, repo rates, and counterparty credit risk contribute to determine the total valuation adjustment.
Introduction
We study the total valuation adjustment (XVA) of a European style claim under differential borrowing and lending rates. We adopt the framework introduced in the companion paper of Bichuch et al. (2015) , where the authors define buyer's and seller's XVA in terms of solutions to non-linear BSDEs. These characterize the portfolio process replicating long and short positions in the claim, and take into account early termination of the contract due to counterparty credit risk, funding spreads, as well as collateral servicing costs. When funding spreads are zero, security lending and borrowing rates coincide, and collateral rates paid by the taker equal the ones received by the provider, Bichuch et al. (2015) give explicit expressions for the XVA as well as for the corresponding replicating strategies. However, in most realistic market scenarios, rates are asymmetric and funding spreads constitute a significant driver of XVA. Despite the unavailability of closed form expressions, in this paper we show that we can exploit the connection between the BSDEs and the corresponding nonlinear PDEs to study how funding costs, collateral and counterparty risk affect the total valuation adjustment.
Our study extends previous literature along two directions. First, we develop a rigorous study of the semilinear PDEs associated with the nonlinear BSDEs introduced in Bichuch et al. (2015) and yielding the XVA prices. Previous studies in this direction include Mercurio (2013) , who gives the PDE representations for the lower and upper bound prices of options in an extended Piterbarg (2010) 's model where borrowing and lending rates differ. However, he does not take into account counterparty risk. This is accounted for in Burgard and Kjaer (2011a) and Burgard and Kjaer (2011b) , who consider an extended Black-Scholes framework where two corporate bonds are introduced in order to hedge the default risk of the trader and of his counterparty. They generalize their framework in Burgard and Kjaer (2013) to include collateral mitigation and evaluate the impact of different funding strategies. We also mention Crépey and Song (2014) who study a BSDE with random terminal time of the type appearing in a funding valuation context, but do not develop connections to the resulting PDE.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of a viscosity solution to the PDE. We extend standard results of Delong (2013) by using the locality of the viscosity solution, and also by accounting for the possibility of default risk. We then show that the PDE also admits a classical solution implying existence and uniqueness of the classical solution. Our result contrasts with earlier studies in the funding literature, e.g. Burgard and Kjaer (2011b) , where smoothness of the price of the derivative contract with respect to the underlying spot asset price is usually assumed to hold, and the PDE is derived after assuming that the market does not admit arbitrage. Using the classical solution, we compute the replicating strategies of the traded claim in a portfolio consisting of a stock, and risky bonds of the trader and of his counterparty. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to establish this result. Crépey (2013a) develops a connection between the funding BSDE and the solution of a classical PDE, but in a different framework where the resulting PDE is linear and the market model complete, see Section 5.2 therein. We also mention the recent work of Nie and Rutkowski (2013) who establish classical solutions to quasi-linear PDEs corresponding with BSDEs yielding the fair bilateral prices of a European contingent claim. Their work, however, does not consider the possibility that the trader or his counterparty can default.
A second noticeable contribution of our study is a comprehensive numerical analysis made possible by the previously established existence and uniqueness result. Earlier studies on funding, such as Bielecki and Rutkowski (2014) , Crépey (2013a), and Brigo et al. (2012) lack the computational component. We find strong sensitivity of XVA to funding costs, counterparty risk and collateralization levels. Viewing both buyer's and seller's XVA as functions of collateralization levels defines a no-arbitrage band whose width increases with the funding spread. As the position becomes more collateralized, the value of the closeout payment increases and leads the trader to implement a riskier strategy. This yields increased buyer's and seller's XVA. Interestingly, both of these quantities may decrease in the counterparty's default intensity as the default premium compensation demanded by the investor for holding counterparty's bonds becomes higher than the funding costs incurred when replicating the closeout position. Moreover, increased values of counterparty's default intensity reduce both seller's and buyer's XVA by a similar amount.
Our findings serve as a useful guide to risk-management and trading desks, who can decide on the terms of the trades (collateralization levels, borrowing rates charged by treasury, etc...) based on the incurred costs as measured by XVA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the framework for computing XVA introduced in Bichuch et al. (2015) . Section 3 analyzes the semilinear PDEs. Section 4 develops a comprehensive numerical analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The setup
We review the setup introduced in the companion paper by Bichuch et al. (2015) and refer to sections 2 and 3 of their paper for additional details. We give here a self-contained exposition needed to understand the PDE analysis presented in the next section. We fix a probability space (Ω, G, P), where P denotes the physical probability measure. The market filtration is G t := F t ∨ H t , t ≥ 0, where the filtrations F t and H t will be specified later in the section.
We take the viewpoint of an investor "I" (also referred to as trader or hedger) who wants to compute the total valuation adjustment, abbreviated as XVA, of a European claim traded with a counterparty "C". The claim is written on a stock whose time t price is denoted by S t . The claim matures at T and has terminal payoff Φ(S T ), where Φ : R >0 → R is a piecewise continuously differentiable real valued function of polynomial growth. The value of the claim, as determined by a third party evaluator, is given byV
where Q is the measure used by the third party to valuate the claim using risk-neutral valuation with discount rate r D .
The portfolio securities
This section describes the securities at disposal of the investor to construct his replicating portfolio. They include the default-free stock on which the financial claim is written, and two risky bonds underwritten by the trader and by his counterparty. Under the physical measure, the dynamics of the stock price process is given by dS t = µS t dt + σS t dW P t , where µ and σ are constants. Moreover, W P is a standard Brownian motion under the probability measure P. We set F := (F t ) t≥0 to be the (G, P)-augmentation of the filtration generated by W P .
Let τ I and τ C be the default times of the trader and of his counterparty, respectively. These are independent exponentially distributed random variables with constant intensities h P i , i ∈ {I, C}. We use H i t = 1l {τ i ≤t} , t ≥ 0, to denote the default indicator process of the i-th name. The default event filtration is set to H t := σ(H I u , H C u ; u ≤ t). The two risky bonds underwritten by the trader I and by his counterparty C have the same maturity T of the claim. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i ∈ {I, C}, their price processes admit dynamics given by
where r i is constant. Throughout the paper, we set τ := τ I ∧ τ C ∧ T . We also recall the following relation, given in Bichuch et al. (2015) , between the physical measure P and the valuation measure Q:
Security, funding, and collateral accounts
This section describes the various trading accounts used by the hedger to finance the strategy replicating the price process of the claim.
The security account
Financing and lending activities related to the stock security happen via the repo market. We denote by r + r the rate at which interests are paid to the hedger when he lends money to the repo market. Symmetrically, we denote by r − r the rate at which the hedger needs to pay interests when he borrows money from the repo market. Let ψ t be the number of shares of the security account at time t. The value of this account at t is given by
where
The funding account
The hedger finances the portfolio strategy to replicate the claim from his treasury. We denote by r + f the rate at which the hedger lends cash to the treasury, and by r − f the rate at which he borrows cash from it. Let ξ f t denote the number of shares of the funding account at time t, whose value is given by
Collateral account
Each party posts collateral to mitigate potential losses incurred by the other party in case of default. Collateral is in the form of variation margins, i.e. cash transfers are made by the out-of-the money party to cover unfavourable moves in the value of the underlying transaction. On {τ I ∧ τ C > t}, the collateral process is given by
where the collateralization level 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 determines the amount of covered exposure. Notice that in our setup, if the investor sold the claim to his counterparty then he is always be the collateral taker (C t < 0), while if he purchased the claim from this counterparty he will always be the collateral provider (C t > 0). We denote by r + c the rate at which interests on the collateral posted by the hedger are paid by the counterparty, and by r − c the rate at which interests on the collateral are paid by the hedger if he is the collateral taker. The collateral account is defined by 
Close-out value of transaction
Since both the hedger and his counterparty can default, the transaction can terminate prematurely.
In the event of a default, the mark-to-market value of the transaction equals the residual value, after mitigating on-default related losses with the available collateral. Let x + := max(x, 0), and x − := max(0, −x), be respectively the positive and negative parts of a real number x. Denote by θ τ (V ) the value of the transaction which must be replicated by the hedger at the earlier of the hedger's and the counterparty's default time (if positive the hedger owes this amount to the counterparty). This is given by
:
Here 0 ≤ L I ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ L C ≤ 1 are constant loss rates. We refer to Section 3.3 of Bichuch et al. (2015) for a detailed explanation.
Total valuation adjustment
We review the definition of XVA given in Bichuch et al. (2015) . Denote by V t (ϕ) the wealth process of the hedger associated with the strategy ϕ, where ϕ :
We recall from above that ξ f is the number of shares of the funding account. We use ξ to denote the number of stock shares. Moreover, ξ I and ξ C denote the number of shares of the bonds underwritten by the trader, and by his counterparty, respectively. The wealth process V (ϕ) is given by the following expression
(10) Bichuch et al. (2015) show that, under the valuation measure Q, the dynamics of the wealth process is given by
t− , the dynamics (11) may be rewritten as
Next, we distinguish between V + t and −V − t . We use V + t to describe the wealth process of the hedger when he replicates the claim Φ(S T ) (hence hedging the position after selling the claim with terminal payoff Φ(S T )). On the other hand −V − t describes the wealth process when replicating the claim −Φ(S T ) (hence hedging the position after buying the claim with terminal payoff Φ(S T )). To this purpose, define
where the driver depends on the market evaluation process (V t ) (via the collateral (C t )). In particular
are drivers of the BSDEs. Moreover, define V + , V − as solutions of the BSDEs −dV
and
We have the following main theorem Theorem 2.1 (Bichuch et al. (2015) ). Assume that
and r The total valuation adjustment XVA is defined as the amount that needs to be added to the BlackScholes price (exclusive of funding costs) to get the actual price (inclusive of funding costs). This is asymmetric for sell-and buy-prices. Bichuch et al. (2015) define the XVAs as follows. 
XVA sell corresponds to the total costs that the hedger incurs when replicating the payoff of a claim he sold, whereas XVA buy corresponds to the total costs that he incurs when replicating the payoff of a claim he purchased. We note that the difference of the XVAs also describes the width of the no-arbitrage interval, as
PDE representations of XVA
This section derives the PDE representations corresponding to the master BSDEs (15) Delong (2013) .
To simplify notation, we will not specify the argument of the latter functions. Then we can rewrite the BSDE in (15) as
whereÑ j,Q , j ∈ {I, C}, are the compensated Poisson random measures such that
we also refer to the proof of Theorem A.2 in Bichuch et al. (2015) for technical details). Let v(t, s) be the price of the claim at time t conditioned on S t = s, i.e.v(t, S t ) =V t .
Theorem 3.2. Under the no-arbitrage conditions in (17), v is a viscosity solution of the following PDE:
Here, we have used the notation v i = ∂v ∂w i , i ∈ {I, C}, and with slight abuse of notation θ i , i ∈ {I, C}, corresponds to the price of the contract at default of either party, similar to the way it was defined in (9). Specifically,
Additionally, v is the unique viscosity solution of the PDE
Proof. The following proof is an extension of the results from Theorem 4.2.2 in Delong (2013) along two directions. The first is that, by contrast with Delong, we use the local property (as opposed to the global property) of the viscosity solution (cf. e,g, (Shreve and Soner , 1994 , Section 7)). The second is that we account for the occurrence of defaults, thus we need to extend the argument of Delong (2013) to the case when the terminal time is a stopping time, rather than constant. Concretely, we need to consider the solution on the set {t < τ }.
. Instead of working with φ directly, we will work with a local approximation. Let h > 0 be small enough, such that t 0 + h < T . As the default intensities h
are both strictly positive. Additionally, w.l.o.g. we may assume that φ is bounded. Specifically, let {φ n } n≥1 be a subsequence such that φ n ∈ C 1,2,2,2 b
, and such that it converges to φ together with its derivatives uniformly on compacts. For some
This allows us to make the further assumption that (t 0 , s 0 , , s) ). We now have that φ n 1 +1 (t, S t ,
, even if the default happens during this time interval. In the sequel, we will use φ n 1 +1 in place of φ, but we will abuse notation and continue referring to it as φ.
For t 0 ≤ t ≤ t 0 + h define (V ,Z,Z I ,Z C ) to be a solution to the following BSDE:
This BSDE has a unique solution by Theorem A.2 in Bichuch et al. (2015) , soV is well defined. By the comparison Theorem A.3 in Bichuch et al. (2015) , we obtain thatV t∧τ 1l {τ >t} ≥ V t∧τ 1l {τ >t} . For convenience, we define the operator
where the Lévy measure ν j (dx) = h Q j δ 1 (dx), j ∈ {I, C}, with δ 1 being the Dirac measure concentrated at 1. Additionally, letΘ
By Itô's formula, we have that for
It follows that
Now, assume by contradiction that φ violates the subsolution property, i.e. there exists > 0 such that
By continuity, and by possibly reducing h and the open neighborhood of (t 0 , s 0 , w I 0 , w C 0 ), we may assume that it is also true inside the neighborhood
Since f is Lipschitz, we can show in a similar way as in Delong (2013) 
where we have introduced another stopping time (26) and the fact that the default intensities h
and similarly that
Here and throughout this proof, we will abuse notation and use C > 0 to denote a generic constant, which may be different in each inequality below. It follows that
This shows that for sufficiently small h > 0, we have that
From the comparison Theorem A.3 in Bichuch et al. (2015) we get thatV t 0 ∧τ 1l {τ >t 0 } ≥ 0. Using this along with (23), we conclude that
where the second inequality follows from the fact that the driver f of our BSDE is Lipschitz along with the Hölder's inequality (setting the exponent to 2), while the last inequality follows from the estimates given by the inequalities (24) and (25). This yields a contradiction, as we let h 0. Hence φ does not violate the subsolution property.
In order to incorporate the jump condition (20) at the jump time τ , note that we can rewrite the subsolution property for φ as
where we set
Under the no arbitrage conditions given by (17), it follows that f 1 is an increasing function in both arguments z I and z C . By continuity of v (see e.g. Lemma 4.1.1 of Delong (2013)), it follows that φ(τ I , S τ I ,
Together with (27) it follows that
This shows that φ is a subsolution of the PDE (21) as claimed.
Finally, the uniqueness result, follows from the uniqueness of the solution to the BSDE, which in turn follows from the comparison Theorem A.3 in Bichuch et al. (2015) . 
Remark 3.4. Additionally, we will also employ the standard change of variables x = log s, so that
Note that this change of variables allows us to get rid of boundary conditions at S = 0. Then, the PDE (28) together with the boundary condition (29) becomes
Hence, we can express the whole pricing problem as a Cauchy problem for a two-dimensional system of semilinear PDEs:
where the differential operators are defined by
It turns out that the PDE (30)-(31) (resp. (28)- (29)) not only has a unique viscosity solution, but this solution is also a classical solution if we assume that Φ and Φ (where defined) have at most polynomial growth, i.e., |Φ(s)
The classical argument of Theorem 20.2.1 in Cannon (1984) assumes a bounded terminal condition, but we can employ a change of variables and divide by (1 + s 2n ) to utilize their framework:
In this case, our PDE (28)- (29) becomes:
We can then prove the following Proposition 3.5. Assume that Φ is piecewise continuously differentiable and Φ as well as Φ (where defined) have at most polynomial growth, i.e., |Φ(s)
. Then the PDE (30) with terminal condition (31) has a classical solution.
Proof. Assume first that Φ is continuosly differentiable. Using the transformation (32) given above, it is then suffices to prove that (33)- (34) has a classical solution. The above transformation guarantees that bothΦ andΦ are bounded. Then the existence of a smooth (and bounded) solution to (33)- (34) follows from Theorem 20.2.1 in Cannon (1984) . In the case thatΦ is only piecewise smooth, the original proof can be modified following a similar procedure to Jouini and Kallal (1995) . Hence, using the change of variables (32), we conclude that there exists a classical solution to the PDE (30) with terminal condition (31).
Combining Proposition 3.5 with the uniqueness result from Theorem 3.2 allows us to conclude that there exists a unique classical solution to the PDE with polynomial growth. Moreover, the hedging strategies can be easily found by an application of Theorem A.1. Using the relations in (12) we find that on the set {t < τ }
, j ∈ {I, C}.
where we have used that the bond price
, by virtue of (1) and the relations between the measures P and Q given in Eq. (2).
Numerical analysis
We perform a comparative statics analysis to analyze the dependence of XVA and portfolio replicating strategies on funding rates, default intensities, and collateralization levels. We consider the relative XVA, i.e. express the adjustment as a percentage of the priceV t of the claim, given by
Vt−Vt Vt
, where
t depending on whether we are considering buyer's or seller's XVA. The claim is chosen to be a European-style call option on the stock security, i.e. Φ(x) = (x − K) + . We consider one at-the-money option with S 0 = K = 1 maturing at T = 1. In order to focus on the impact of funding costs (which in practice is the most relevant) and separate it from additional contributions to the XVA coming from asymmetries in collateral and repo rates, we set r + r = r − r = 0.05, and r + c = r − c = 0.01. As the derivatives contract does not only specify the price of the option but also the levels of collateralization of the deal, the no-arbitrage region appears as a (two-dimensional) band in XV A and α rather than as a (one-dimensional) interval in XV A only.
We also use the following other benchmark parameters: σ = 0.2, r Higher funding rates increase the width of the no-arbitrage band. Figure 1 displays the no-arbitrage band whose width is increasing in the funding rate r − f . As α gets higher, the band noticeably shrinks reaching its minimum around α = 80% before widening again. Notice that buyer's and seller's XVA do not have a symmetric behavior. This can be better understood by analyzing the dependence of the band on the collateralization level α in Figure 1 . If α is not too high (α < 0.5), the widening of the no-arbitrage band with respect to the funding rate r If α is high, the trader will have to post more collateral and consequently reduce the cash available to finance his replicating strategy. He will then have to borrow more from the funding desk, resulting in higher funding costs. This drives up both the seller's XVA and the number of shares of stocks and bonds needed for the replication strategy. to changes in the funding rate r − f . We see also that a higher risk-neutral counterpaty default risk decreases the XVA, a seemingly counterintuitive fact that we will explore later in more detail.
Higher collateralization increases portfolio holdings. As the collateralization level α increases, the seller's XVA increases. This happens because the value of the closeout position becomes higher as it can be directly seen from Eq. (9) (notice thatV > 0 because we are considering a short call option position). The trader would then need to construct a portfolio replicating a larger position, hence he must take more risk. He achieves this by increasing the number of shares of stock and bond underwritten by the counterparty. Moreover, higher collateralization levels reduce the size of the downward negative jump to the closeout value occurring when the trader defaults. Consequently, the trader needs to purchase a smaller amount of his bonds to replicate this position as α increases. This behavior is confirmed from the plot in Figure 3. The width of the no-arbitrage band is insensitive to counterparty's default intensity. Figure 3 shows that both seller's and buyers's XVA decrease, if the counterparty's default intensity h Q C increases. When α is low, the two quantities drop by nearly the same amount and the width of Consistently with Figure 3 , Figure 4 shows that the seller's XVA decreases when the default intensity of the counterparty h Q C increases. This can be understood as follows. Using the relations between the default intensities under the probability measures P and Q given in Eq. (2), we can see that increasing h Q C is equivalent to increasing the bond rate r C while keeping the default probability under P constant. Hence, the trader would earn higher premium from his long position in counterparty's bonds (see also bottom panels of Figure 4 ). Such a gain dominates over the funding costs incurred when replicating a larger closeout position (Eq. (9) indicates that the closeout payment increases to the risk-free payoffV as h Q C increases). Altogether, this means that the funding costs of the investor would be reduced as h Q C increases. Hence, the dependence of XVA on counterparty's default intensity contrasts with its sensitivity to collateralization levels numerically illustrated in Figure 1 . This is because higher default risk of the counterparty also means higher return on the bond underwritten by her, whereas higher α only means that a larger value of the closeout payment needs to be replicated.
Conclusions
We have developed a rigorous analysis of the semilinear PDE associated with the BSDE characterizing the price process of a portfolio replicating a European option, when funding, collateral and closeout costs are taken into account. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of a classical solution to the PDE under mild assumptions on the coefficients. Using this result, we have conducted a thorough numerical study analyzing the sensitivity of XVA and of the claim's replication strategy to collateralization levels, default risk and rates asymmetries. Our findings support the introduction of centralized XVA desks to manage and hedge all costs related to over-the-counter transactions. It shows that funding costs originating from the different trading components cannot be easily separated and hence attributed to different business units (CVA, DVA and FVA desks) because they are highly interdependent.
A PDEs and replication strategies
Recall the measurable functionv from Remark 3.3 that was defined byv(t, S t ) = V t 1l {τ >t} . The following theorem shows how the functionv can be used to compute the hedging strategies. Noting that the law of S t is absolutely continuous, the proof of the theorem becomes analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.1.4 in Delong (2013) . Hence, we omit it here and only give the statement of the theorem. Theorem A.1. Consider the data (f, θ τ (V (τ, S τ )),V (T, S T )) for the BSDE given by (15). Additionally, let the functionv(t, S t ) = V t 1l {τ >t} be defined as in Remark 3.3. Then, on the set {t < τ } we have that Z t = σS tvS (t, S t ),
